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ABSTRACT 
Using a data set collected from dictionaries of business biography 
and probate records, this article analyses entrepreneurial 
performance in Britain since the middle of the nineteenth century. 
Lifetime wealth accumulation is specified as a measure of 
entrepreneurial performance and applied empirically to analyse the 
link between aspects of culture and entrepreneurship. The analysis 
identifies a negative performance effect for fmu inheritors and for 
those receiving a high social status education. New fmu founders, 
managers, and those with a lower social status education are shown 
to have been comparatively successful. Industry, region and 
religious dissent are ruled out as explanations for the performance 
patterns established. The method and findings pose important 
implications for the debate concerning culture and entrepreneurship 
in Britain. 
CLOGS TO CLOGS IN THREE GENERATIONS? 
EXPLAINING ENTREPRENEURIAL PERFORMANCE IN BRITAIN SINCE 1850 
Entrepreneurial ability is not always inherited according to Alfred Marshall in his 
Principles of Economics. 
When a man has got together a great business his descendants often 
fail in spite of their great advantages to develop the high abilities and 
special turn of mind and temperament required for carrying it on 
with equal success ... When a full generation has passed, when the old 
traditions are no longer a safe guide and when the bonds that held 
together the old staff have been dissolved, then the business almost 
invariably falls to pieces.) 
Most references to inheritance and entrepreneurship in the economic history 
literature cite Landes' influential account of European industrialisation, which 
describes late nineteenth century Britain as plagued by family frrms, tradition and 
inflexibility.2 Inherited business ownership is said to have created complacency and 
conservatism while the pursuit of social and political distinction encouraged 
entrepreneurial lethargy.3 The persistence of family capitalism supposedly delayed 
the adoption of efficient administrative and organisational structures, so that British 
frrms fell behind their competitors in terms of both capacity and efficiency.4 A 
) Marshall, Principles, pp. 299-300. 
2 See for example, Berghoffand M(}ller, 'Tired Pioneers', p. 262. 
3 There are various references for this view. See further, Aldcroft, 'The 
Entrepreneur'; Coleman, 'Gentlemen and Players'; Kindleberger, Economic 
Growth; Landes, Unbound; Payne, British Entrepreneurship. Using case study 
evidence Rose, 'Beyond Buddenbrooks', argues that poor provision for succession 
into the business leadership of family frrms contributed to failure. 
4 Chandler, Scale and Scope. 
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lacklustre enterprise culture, it has been argued, was a primary obstacle to 
economic growth.s 
But what is the evidence for this failure? Judgements of performance 
invariably rest on individual case studies that are sufficient neither to refute nor 
confirm more general hypotheses of weak British entrepreneurship. The Kenrick 
family in hardware manufacture, the Du Cross' s in rubber and the Crawshay's in 
iron and steel provide salutary tales of dynastic downfall. But instances of success 
are equally plentiful. Before 1914 the three largest fums in Britain, J&P Coats, 
Imperial Tobacco and Watney Combe Reid were built up around the family rather 
than new management structures. Cad bury Brothers, the epitome of good 
management, is an example of a family firm that thrives today. 
Explanations of culturally induced economic decline have proved difficult 
to substantiate or defend using qualitative, archival or institutional research 
methods. In the historical debate about culture's influence on economic 
performance, education has typically occupied a prominent role. The public school 
with its emphasis on anti-individualism is singled out for condemnation. The slow 
pace of technical advance, especially in the old staple industries, has been 
attributed to the practical exclusion from the public school curriculum of scienGe 
and technology studies.6 Yet the evidence is far from conclusive. As Berghoff 
points out, "so far no one has really proved that a classical education always has a 
negative effect on non-classical careers".7 
S There are various manifestations of the cultural thesis. The most well known 
,(certainly the most derided) is Wiener, English Culture. For a summary of this 
debate see Coli ins and Robbins, British Culture and Rubinstein, Capitalism. 
6 Ward, 'Public Schools' ; Warwick, 'Did Britain Change' . 
7 Berghoff, 'Public Schools', p. 161. 
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Several writers have followed Weber's theory of 'ascetic Protestantism' 
arguing that non-confonnism is the handmaiden of economic growth in a capitalist 
society. To a large degree the evidence is impressionistic. For Ashton, the fact that 
non-confonnists were better educated than the rest of the middle class in eighteenth 
and nineteenth century Britain accounts for their prominence in business Iife.8 Non-
confonnist teaching that idleness was a source of sin and immorality is said to have 
encouraged profit-seeking entrepreneurship, while mutual systems of support 
provided access to infonnation, credit and trading patterns.9 A number of studies 
use empirical data to test the hypothesis that non-confonnists were over-
represented in the ranks of Britain's entrepreneurs.1O But these studies do not 
adequately distinguish between entry into entrepreneurship and eventual success. 11 
So far, there has been no direct test of the hypothesis that religious affiliation is a 
detenninant of business perfonnance.12 
This article systematically analyses the link between aspects of culture and 
entrepreneurship. A measure of entrepreneurial perfonnance is developed using 
infonnation on lifetime wealth accumulation. Entrepreneurs are profiled using 
categories such as finn type, education, religion, and industry and region. Key 
8 Ashton, Industrial Revolution, p. 19. 
9 Kindleberger, Economic Growth. 
10 Berghoff, 'British Businessmen'; Hagen, Social Change; Howe, Col/on Masters; 
Rubinstein, Men of Property. 
11 This argument has been made by Berghoff, 'British Businessmen'. If society 
creates an outgroup, in this case non-confonnists, one would expect to fmd an 
over-representation of non-confonnists in the business community. The cause, 
rather than inherent entrepreneurial ability, might be restricted access to alternative 
career paths such as the professions. 
12 For further infonnation on this issue see Kirby, 'Quakerism', p.105. 
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issues relating to the debate on culture and entrepreneurship in Britain are 
explored. 
A PERFORMANCE MEASURE 
In the economic history literature, the use of economic theory to assess 
entrepreneurial performance is confined almost exclusively to the application of 
the neo-classical paradigm.13 Business historians have made performance 
judgements using individual case studies, but debate has centred largely on the 
issue of whether entrepreneurs active in British industry were economically 
rational in their choices of technology. Advances in endogenous growth theory 
pose important implications for this research. Taking into consideration different 
market environments, resource flows and technology spillovers in the investment 
decisions of entrepreneurs, "endogenous growth theory may offer additional lines 
of defence for those wishing to absolve British business of any failure" .14 
However, performance tests based on growth theory are unlikely to sway 
the critics who favour cultural explanations of Britain's relative retardation. 
Wiener, a key exponent of the so-called 'cultural critique', argues that the reasons 
which explain British economic decline remain beyond the sole domain of the 
economist. ls A central objective of this article is to combine both economic theory 
and the empirical study of culture in order to re-examine the hypothesis of 
culturally induced entrepreneurial decline in Britain. A performance test is 
13 McCloskey, 'Victorian Britain' and McCloskey and Sandberg, 'From Damnation 
to Redemption', are perhaps the most well known examples. 
14 Crafts, 'Forging Ahead', p. 206. 
IS See Wiener, English Culture and the chapter entitled 'British Retardation - The 
Limits of Economic Explanation' . 
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undertaken on the basis of a link between profit as the reward for exploiting 
business opportunities and the lifetime wealth outcomes of entrepreneurs. 
In accordance with Knight and Schumpeter, and more recent theorists, it 
is assumed that the pursuit of profit is the prime motivation for entrepreneurial 
activity, even though there can be non-pecuniary influences on the entrepreneurial 
labour supply such as a preference for work independence, power, or status.16 
Profit arises through entrepreneurship in a variety of forms. In a Schumpterian 
sense entrepreneurship is a productive activity which benefits society and the 
economy. Profit is generated through the introduction of new goods, new methods 
of production, the opening of a new market, or the creation of a new type of 
industrial organisation. Additionally, as emphasised by Baumol, profit return can 
derive from activities that damage the industrial system. Entrepreneurs can create 
long-standing monopolies or expose gaps in the legal system as a consequence of 
the prevailing reward structure. Entrepreneurship can be a rent-seeking activity 
with a zero marginal product yield to the economy.17 
If the neo-classical assumption of free entry and free exit of the 
entrepreneurial labour supply is assumed, profits will tend towards zero in 
competitive equilibrium. With favourable business cycle conditions profits will be 
higher, may vary across frrrns, and be exploited through the creation of a 
monopoly. In the long run, however, profits converge to their competitive 
equilibrium level because of the perfect competition assumption. In competitive 
equilibrium there is a return for entrepreneurship, but this is simply a reward for 
the entrepreneur's labour supply .. s 
16 Knight, Risk; Schumpeter, Economic Development. See also, Baumol, 
Entrepreneurship; Cas son, The Entrepreneur. 
17 Baumol, Entrepreneurship. 
IS See Mueller, Profits, especially pp. 1-33. 
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If profits do tend towards their competitive equilibrium rate why choose 
entrepreneurship over regular wage work? According to Blanchflower and Oswald 
ex ante profits can be assumed to be indeterminate, which provides a spur to 
entrepreneurial activity. Then if the equilibrium condition does not hold ex post, 
for example through imperfect capital markets that constrain the supply of 
entrepreneurship, the entrepreneur can achieve supernormal returns. The utility gap 
between entrepreneurs and wage-workers is wider in the presence of imperfect 
capital markets. Those who gain access to investment funds can receive 
supernormal returns for their business effort. 19 
In the absence of a competitive process to eliminate supernormal profits 
those who overcome credit constraints can maximise their rate of accumulation. 
The greater the profit in disequilibria the more intense is the inducement towards 
entrepreneurship. If the pursuit of profit is the prime motivation for 
entrepreneurship, more able entrepreneurs will be distinguishable ceteris paribus 
by their higher rate of profit accumulation. In a purely economic maximisation 
scenario, one way to identify success from relative failure would be to measure 
differences in profits. 
Although profit data are not generally available a proxy measure of 
entrepreneurial performance can be introduced using information on lifetime 
wealth accumulation.20 Suppose profit Pi is equivalent to the entrepreneur's 
19 Blanchflower and Oswald, 'Supernormal Returns'. 
20 In order to obtain profit data entrepreneurs must be considered as the 
embodiment of their firms - there are no such data at the individual level. Even 
with this assumption the availability of information is severely restricted for studies 
with an historical perspective. Very few fums took advantage of early limited 
liability legislation. Moreover, it was not until the 1948 Companies Act that fmns 
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income y,. In long run competitive equilibrium an entrepreneur will receives 
profit income payments generated by the process, 
(I) 
where Cl is a non-negative random variable distributed as NCO,a;) such that 
realisations of Cl are serially uncorrelated. If the competitive equilibrium condition 
does not hold, the entrepreneur can receive supernormal returns such that, 
(2) 
Making the link with lifetime wealth accumulation, consider an entrepreneur active 
over n years beginning in business time t with initial wealth W. Profit income 
generated through entrepreneurship can either be consumed Cl or saved. The 
entrepreneur's wealth evolves as, 
w, + " = [w, + yl - CI](1 + r)" (3) 
where the terminal wealth outcome is measured by profit income due to enterprise 
and labour, a return on initial wealth and adjusted downwards for consumption 
expenditure.21 
were forced to detail information about their true assets and profits in consolidated 
annual balance sheets. 
21 For a detailed theoretical appraisal of wealth accumulation see, Hall, 'Stochastic 
Implications' . 
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If equation 3 is rearranged the 'rate of return' r can be calculated in order 
to distinguish between large values of Wt+n caused by inherited wealth and large 
values, relative to Wt, caused by entrepreneurship. 
[ ( 
W,+II )] 1 
r =, W, + yl _ Cl - (4) 
Differences in r will depend on the entrepreneur's ability to exploit profit-
making opportunities and generate a rate of return on initial wealth. Since initial 
wealth is commonly inherited the formula is useful for analysing the performance 
of family firms . Finn inheritors can make excessive demands on the wealth built up 
by parents and grandparents . Using this performance measure the proverbial 
hypothesis of "clogs to clogs in three generations" can be subjected to an empirical 
test. 
THE DATA SET 
Data collection has been carried out using information in the Dictionary of 
Business Biography (DBB) the Dictionary of Twentieth Century British Business 
Leaders and probate archival holdings. 22 All deceased individuals on whom 
information was available were gathered into a data set. Birth dates range from 
1789 to 1937 and death dates from 1868 to 1993. These individuals were active in 
British business during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. A total of 1149 
I 
observations were obtained, of which 1079 include terminal wealth entries. An 
22 Probate records were consulted at the Probate Registry, Somerset House, 
London. 
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empirical counterpart of equation 4 is estimated for 283 individuals in the data set 
on whom terminal and inherited wealth entries were gathered. 
Since the publication of the biographical sources it has been possible to 
consider omissions and erroneous inclusions and to challenge the view of the 
editors that the result is a balanced coverage of entrepreneurial leadership in Britain 
over the last century and a half. In some instances names in the sources seem to 
have been included for their non-business interests. John Maynard Keynes (1883-
1946) was principally renowned as an economist and investment policy analyst, 
though he held several directorships of London based corporations. Others were 
perhaps included because their work was technologically significant. Sir Henry 
Bessemer (1813-1898) was an inventor first, an engineer and steel master second. 
His Bessemer Converter made the last Bessemer steel in England in 1974, but his 
business interests remained comparatively minor.23 
How representative are the data of British entrepreneurship? Certainly the 
many who entered into the entrepreneurial labour market but failed will not be 
included in the data set, aside from a few well-documented cases of failure and the 
colourful careers of rogue figures. But whether included as success stories or as 
spectacular example of failure the catchment area of the biographical sources is 
wide. Hannah and Jeremy claim that the DBB is a collection of the "nations 
entrepreneurs" and in doing so accord with the view that, 
any attempt at a rigid definition of the term entrepreneur ... [should 
be avoided] ... because whatever attributes are selected they are sure 
to prove excessively restrictive, ruling out some feature, activity or 
accomplishment of this inherently subtle and elusive character".24 
23 See the entries for Keynes and Bessemer in the DBB. 
24 Baumol, Entrepreneurship, p. 7. 
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Firm founders, inventors, and managers are included in the sources because 
all may be said to have contributed to business leadership in Britain. Although flrm 
foundation is commonly taken as the deflning element of entrepreneurship 
typifying the distinction between profit seeking entrepreneurs and wage earning 
workers, other functions may be considered as 'entrepreneurial'. Inventors can 
attempt to appropriate a profit return from their inventions using patents and 
licenses. Managers can be credited with transforming inventions into useable 
products. The manager's wage is, in part, a reflection of the firm's profitability but 
it can also be complemented with equity holding. Rubinstein's analysis of the very 
wealthy in Britain shows that even non-asset holding businessmen could amass 
fortunes by investing their salaries.2s 
A speciflc source of bias in the DBB and DTBB is the overrepresentation of 
individuals active in manufacturing and mineral extraction industries. This bias can 
be identified with a simple, if also imperfect, test. Individuals active in 
manufacturing and mineral extraction industries account for 66 per cent of those in 
the full sample (1149 individuals) which can be compared with a benchmark 
calculation using Broadberry's sectoral shares of employment. Broadberry's 
figures, adjusted, show that if there was no bias in the sample manufacturing and 
mineral extraction industries would account for around 46 per cent of those 
included.26 This sectoral bias does not invalidate hypothesis tests, but it does place 
the findings in a qualifled context. It is only possible to explore the characteristics 
2S Rubinstein, Men of Property, pp. 176-192. 
26 Broadberry, 'Productivity Levels', p.385. This is the equivalent comparable 
share of the work force active in such industries on average between 1871 and 1990 
as calculated from Broadberry's data. My re-adjustment calculation excludes 
agriculture and government sectors from Broadberry's figures because such sectors 
are also excluded from the biographical sources. The sectoral share of employment 
II 
of the observed sample and make inferences that relate to a specified population. 
The representation in the DBB and DTBB, albeit broad, is heavily weighted 
towards manufacturing and mineral extraction industries. The data cover mostly 
successful entrepreneurs and minimise failures. The general composition of the 
data set must be reflected in the analytical results. 
An additional bias might be introduced into the analysis if the smaller 
sample, for whom terminal and initial wealth entries were available, over-
represents or under-represents characteristics present in the larger sample. Figure 1 
compares the density of probate terminal wealth (probate records are discussed in 
the following section) for the 1079 individuals and the smaller sample of 283 
individuals on whom such data were available. The kernel density of terminal 
wealth is generated to determine whether the different sample sizes narrow or 
widen the wealth distribution.21 Using terminal wealth as a criterion for comparison 
in Figure 1 it is clear that the distribution is preserved across the sample sizes with 
no apparent loss of generality.28 
for manufacturing and mineral extraction is then an average share of employment 
taken over the five benchmark years, 1871, 1911, 1930, 1950 and 1990. 
21 The kernel function is specified as being Gaussian. The wealth data are corrected 
for price changes using a GDP deflator and indexed in 1938 prices. The deflator is 
obtained by dividing the Feinstein's series of GDP at factor cost in current prices, 
by the series in constant prices given in Mitchell Historical Statistics, pp. pp.831-
832, 837-838. 
28 Similarly under a t-test there is no significant difference between the sample 












Most of the information in the biographical sources is qualitative but it can be 
collected in a quantitative form using binary coding. In order to test hypotheses 
relating to cultural explanations of Britain's relative economic decline, the 
following profile categories outlined below are utilised. 
First, a firm type category separates firm inheritors from non-inheritors. 
Firm inheritors, are classified further as either third or second generation 
entrepreneurs, depending on the relationship between the entrant and the founder. 29 
Non-inheritors are also classified additionally as either career managers or firm 
founders. Second, an education category distinguishes those educated at all public 
schools, a leading public school,30 or an Oxbridge College. Collected together two 
variables identify those receiving a high status education (a public school and/or 
Oxbridge College) and a lower status education (basic elementary or secondary 
29 Where a firm was older than three generations the individual is included under 
the third generation profile variable. There are a few cases in which an individual 
took over a family fmn owned by a brother or cousin of the same generation. 
These cases are coded as fmn inheritors but are neither third nor second generation 
inheritors. To avoid confusion they do not appear again under a separate category. 
30 In Britain a 'public school' is fee-charging and under private management, 
equivalent to a 'private school' in America. A leading public school (equivalent to 
a highly prestigious private school such as Exeter or Andover in America) is 
defined as a Clarendon School comprising of the nine leading schools as 
determined by the Clarendon Commission of 1864. These are Eton, Harrow, 
Winchester, Westminster, Rugby, SI. Paul's, Merchant Taylors, Charterhouse and 
Shrewsbury. 
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education, grammar school and non-Oxbridge university).31 A variable to 
distinguish those with a technicaVscientific education is also included. Third, a 
religion category separates non-conformists from other religious groups. The 
biographical data has been used to assess the strength and period of allegiance 
because in some instances individuals did switch from one religion to another.12 
Finally a region/industry category is used to separate individuals active in ,staple 
industries (coal, iron and steel, shipbuilding, textiles), new technology 
manufacturing industries (chemicals, engineering, electricity, car and aircraft 
manufacturing), other manufacturing, and the regions of the north-east and north-
west and London. 
The data series are described in Table I both for the full data set (1149 
observations) and for the number of individuals on whom terminal and inherited 
wealth entries were available (283 observations), Comparing the two series it can 
be seen that the degree of comparability is high, although the smaller sample does 
contain a larger share of individuals active in staple industries, in the north-east and 
north-west and in family firms of older generations. Again the presence of this bias 
does not invalidate hypothesis tests as long as the analytical results are placed in 
the context of the sample. The objective of this article, to link profile 
characteristics with entrepreneurial performance, can be achieved with the data set 
coverage. 
31 An elementary education is up to the age of eleven years and a secondary 
education up to the age of sixteen years. A grammar school is a better level school 
which may be maintained by state funds or be a fee-paying 'independent' school. 
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PROBA TE RECORDS AND ESTIMATION TECHNIQUE 
This section describes how probate records are used to measure the lifetime wealth 
accumulation of the individuals in the data set. In doing so it draws heavily on 
Rubinstein's detailed account of probate records as an archival statistical source.33 
It is not necessary to replicate Rubinstein's general analysis of probate records in 
terms of their salient features and information contained therein. But it is necessary 
to discuss issues that relate to the specification of lifetime wealth accumulation as a 
measure of entrepreneurial success. 
First, wealth recorded by probate may not be an accurate reflection of an 
individual's total worth. Probate records cover just the assets that an executor must 
dispose of and take no account, beyond a certain period prior to death, of gifts 
bestowed upon others. Over time with more severe death duties levied there is 
likely to be, ceteris paribus, a reduction in the value of bequests. Gifts inter vivos, 
investments not aggregated with the estate, or a reduction in the duty value of 
assets provide examples of the ways in which the payment of death duties can be 
dodged.l4 
In order to adjust for reduced bequests through the evasion and avoidance 
of death duties I use a period 'control' to separate individuals liable to different 
taxation regimes. Figure 2 tracks the real rate of duty charged on a variety of sized 
estates between 1894 and 1990. The progressive taxation of wealth transfers over 
time can be seen in the data series. Before the First World War death duty 
payments were relatively minor. After 1919 death duty charges increased 
J2 Jeremy discusses the transfer of businessmen's allegiance in, Business and 
Religion, p. 15-16. 
33 See Rubinstein, Men of Property, pp. 9-27. 
34 See Horsman, 'The Avoidance' and Whalley, 'Estate Duty' . 
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substantially in addition to tighter restrictions on inter vivos giving. Finance Acts 
following the Second World War were associated with higher real rates of death 
duty. The introduction of Capital GainsITransfer and Inheritance Tax reduced the 
tax burden in real terms which is borne out in the data. However, additional 
sanctions on lifetime gifts closed loopholes alleviating exposure to a tax liability on 
death.3s 
In accordance with the legislative developments highlighted in Figure 2, 
and a detailed consideration of death duty administration procedures, the 
individuals in the data set can be separated according to deaths before 1919, 
between 1919 and 1945 and after 1945. The probate terminal and initial wealth 
entries collected will then be subject to similar taxation regimes and broadly 
proportionate pre-death transfers. This procedure is likely to be a noisy estimator of 
death duty evasion and avoidance because of the long time periods involved and 
because of individual heterogeneity. If the errors are normally distributed, 
however, and a large enough set of observations is considered, the deviations will 
not represent a major distortion to the reported results. 
A second issue is that probate provides a snapshot of wealth at a moment 
in time, namely death, which may conceal fluctuations in assets over the life cycle. 
In the context of a standard neo-c1assical utility maximising problem, the 
entrepreneur at the beginning of the life cycle plans consumption and leisure 
supply for the present and the future. The consumption profile will be influenced 
by the rate of time preference. If individuals save over working periods and dissave 
during retirement there will be some running down of assets with old age. If there 
is a bequests motive, households with children may leave more wealth than 
childless households. Or inter vivos gifts can be bestowed upon children reducing 
3S For a detailed description of death duty legislation see Lawday and Mann Death 
Duties and Miller, Succession. 
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the terminal wealth of parents. Altruistic entrepreneurs can turn to philanthropy.36 
In order to test for such effects I specified the following wealth equation 
across the individuals in the data set. Let W be the natural logarithm of probate 
terminal wealth.37 The variables C and A refer to the entrepreneur's number of 
children and age. P is a dummy variable coded one for individuals active in 
philanthropy and zero otherwise. 
The empirical results are reported in Table 2. The period 'control' 
procedure is applied to filter out the effects of death duty evasion and avoidance. 
The standard errors are corrected for possible heteroskedasticity bias. Equation 5 is 
run for both sample sizes (\079 = full sample, 283 = sub-sample) to test for 
changes in the sub-sample results . The larger sample provides a better 'fit' to the 
data, but the coefficients which are significant at the customary levels in both 
samples, are similar in size and share the same sign. 
According to the low R-squared of the regressions, life cycle factors will 
not present a major distortion to the performance measure results. The life cycle 
variables specified account for, at best, 10 per cent of the variation in the logarithm 
of terminal wealth. The parameters on the 'children' variable are not significantly 
different from zero, which means that family size is not a good predictor of the 
terminal wealth outcome. Using the parameters on age, on the other hand, it is 
difficult to prove or disprove that life cycle factors will affect our performance 
measure of entrepreneurship. In contrast to the positive effect of increasing age on 
36 For a discussion of the life cycle model see Modigliani, 'Intergenerational 
Transfers ' , and Kotlikoff, ' Savings'. 
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tenninal wealth in the first cohort, the effect is not significant at the customary 
level in the second cohort, and negative in the case of the third cohort. The life 
cycle theory predicts a polynomial in age, but the squared age tenn is dropped 
from the regressions on an F-test. There are a range of possible explanations for the 
age variable results none of which can be confmned, or denied, with these data.38 
Most of the explained variation in the dependent variable comes from the 
introduction of the philanthropy dummy. This variable is positive and significant at 
better than the 5 per cent level. Cross tabulations reveal that 42, 31 and 28 per cent 
of the individuals in the respective cohorts could be identified as making donations 
to charity. Following Halvorsen and Palmquist the parameters across the three 
cohorts show that the estate of a philanthropist was between 100 and 264 per cent 
greater than that of a non-philanthropist.39 According to these cross section results, 
and assuming identical initial endowments, a philanthropist would score a higher 
perfonnance rating than a non-philanthropist in spite of the philanthropist's 
lifetime reduction in wealth. 
There are complicated issues involved in testing the life cycle hypothesis. 
At the micro level evidence can be amassed both in favour and against life cycle 
37 The wealth data are indexed in 1938 prices using a GDP deflator. 
38 For example, the longer lived may have more time to accumulate wealth and 
leave more at death in periods before the onset of heavy death duty regimes (cohort 
1 results). Higher death duty charges, thereafter may encourage inter vivos giving, 
thus reducing the precautionary demand for wealth at death for older individuals 
(cohort 3 results). A squared age tenn would be more likely to feature in a dynamic 
measure of wealth over the life cycle rather than a static measure of wealth at 
death. 
39 Find the antilog of the parameter estimate and subtract I. See Halvorsen and 
Palmquist, 'Dummy Variables' . 
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patterns of wealth accumulation and decumulation.40 The results from equation 5 
are tentative and serve only as a method of testing the extent to which life cycle 
factors will influence the results of the performance analysis. It appears that neither 
family size nor a propensity for philanthropy will pose a significant distortion. 
Increasing age depending on cohort is both positively and negatively correlated 
with the terminal wealth outcome. Overall, however, only a small percentage of the 
variation is explained. 
A third issue is the measurement of an initial wealth endowment. Recall 
from equation 4 that lifetime wealth accumulation as an index of entrepreneurial 
performance requires known values of terminal and initial wealth. I use the father's 
bequest in the denominator of the expression because fathers represent the sole 
group for whom wealth information could be traced. Ideally, however, indirect 
inheritances would be considered as the sources of inheritance are much wider than 
from father to progeny. In spite of data limits there are good reasons for believing 
that a father's wealth is a useful proxy for an entrepreneur's initial endowment. 
Entrepreneurs can borrow on the expectation of an inheritance or use a father's 
collateral as a means of securing a loan.41 The distribution of wealth in the present 
is closely linked with that of the preceding generation, the major source of wealth 
inequality arising from direct as opposed to indirect inheritances.42 
Collecting the biographical and archival information together, and 
considering the data obtainable, it is possible to calculate what may be described as 
an approximation of r, 
40 Hall and Mishkin, 'Sensitivity'; Runkle, 'Liquidity Constraints'; Zelder, 
'Consumption' . 
41 Blanchflower and Oswald, 'What Makes an Entrepreneur'. 
42 Atkinson, Inequality; Harbury and Hitchens, Inheritance; Harbury and 
McMahon, 'Top Wealth Leavers'. 
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r*=[ (W;;.'J ]-1 (6) 
where r* is the approximation of the rate of return on initial wealth expressed in 
equation 4 and WI+n and WI are probate terminal and inherited wealth 
respectively. The period of business activity in n years is taken as the date of death 
minus the date of entry into entrepreneurship.43 Notwithstanding the fact that 
income and consumption data are missing from the estimated expression, equation 
6 is a close empirical counterpart to equation 4. It can be assumed that 
heterogeneity in consumption will be smoothed out in estimates of r* across a data 
set of individuals. It is a reasonable a priori assumption that wealth will be an 
increasing function ofthe entrepreneur's profit income. 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The estimation results are given in Table 3. In columns 2-4 the mean rate of return 
is given along with its standard error and the number of observations (ob) in each 
ceU.44 The subscript n refers to the average number of years of business activity. 
43 Though most will relinquish their entrepreneurial roles before they die, the 
biographical information is not sufficiently detailed to make the necessary 
adjustment. A lot of detail, however, is provided on the career patterns of the 
individuals included. This makes it possible to establish the date when a business 
career commenced, especially for firm founders, because the date of business start-
up is given. 
44 In 21 cases a father's wealth was equal to zero. A value of £1 was imputed in 
order to estimate the rate of return. I conducted a series of experiments using 
20 
The cohorts are specified using the period 'control' procedure. To correct for 
inflation, the wealth data are indexed respectively in 1900, 1938 and 1980 prices 
using a GDP deflator.4s As with all the estimates in Table 3, comparisons can only 
be made within cohorts as opposed to between cohorts because of the particular 
distortion to recorded wealth created by death duty evasion and avoidance. 
The structure of the results in Table 3 reflects economic and societal 
changes in Britain since the middle of the nineteenth century in addition to data 
availability. In the second cohort a separate category for managers can be specified 
in line with the development of the corporate economy. The post-1945 period 
covered by the third cohort is characterised by the growing ranks of career 
managers in public corporations. Far fewer new firm founders made it into the 
ranks of Britain' s business leaders during this high point of 'organisation society' .46 
The old staple industries are represented in the first two cohorts but not in the third 
where a separate category is specified to account for the rise of the new technology 
industries. Religious categories are included only for the frrst two cohorts reflecting 
the decline of non-conformist denominations and more general trends in twentieth 
century secularisation. 
Before discussing the disaggregated results fully it is useful to consider 
how well, as a group, the entrepreneurs in the data set performed. The frrst row of 
Table 3 reports the unweighted rate of return pooled across the individuals in the 
sample. The parameter estimates can be multiplied by 100 to give the percentage 
rate of return per annum. It can be seen that the average rate of return for each 
higher and lower imputed values (ranging from £0.1 to £ 10), and the substantive 
results remained unchanged. 
4S 1900, 1938 and 1980 are among the standard index years used by Feinstein. 
These years correspond approximately with the average date of death for the 
individuals in the respective cohorts. 
46 Roper, Masculinity pp. 47-73 ., 
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cohort is 9.32, 4.06 and 1.74 per cent per annum respectively. To get some idea of 
the size ofthese percentages, two sets of benchmark figures were estimated. 
First, I calculated the average yield on consols from data assembled by 
Mitchell.47 Consols represent an ultra low performance asset virtually without risk 
of default and may be taken as the minimum expected return from a wealth 
portfolio. At 9.32 per cent the entrepreneur's rate of lifetime wealth accumulation 
in the first cohort is over three times greater than the average yield on consols of 
3.0 per cent per annum between 1870 and 1918. In the second and third cohorts 
there is an illusionary downward effect on the rate of lifetime wealth accumulation 
arising from the negative influence on recorded wealth of heavier death duty 
regimes. Clearly the average yield on consols is not subject to this distortion which 
prevents further comparisons. 
Therefore, I calculated equation 6 for a sample of non-businessmen 
landowners taken from Perkin's data set covering elites in British society since 
1880.48 These landowners are likely to hold a stock of wealth over a number of 
generations rather than generate new wealth through entrepreneurship so their rate 
of return, much like the yield on consols, may be regarded as a threshold level 
below which a successful entrepreneurs would not be expected to fall. The mean 
rates of return for these landowners are given in Table 4. It can be seen that the gap 
between the respective rates of return comparing entrepreneurs and landowners is 
large. The entrepreneurs in the sample displayed favourable rates of lifetime wealth 
accumulation over the three cohorts. 
Finding a high rate of return for the individuals included is not altogether 
47 Mitchell, Historical Statistics, p. 678. 
48 Perkin, Elites [computer file]. These constitute individuals coded as landowners 
under Perkin's category scheme. All individuals for whom Perkin gives probate 
wealth and land value information are included in the calculation. 
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surprising given that the sample is biased towards the inclusion of success stories. 
The entrepreneurs were active mostly in successful fmns and the perfonnance 
judgement is limited by the scope of the data set coverage. The more telling result 
of the exercise comes from disaggregating the sample in order to test the 
hypothesis that particular cultural traits influence entrepreneurial perfonnance. 
The specified industry and region categories can be used to detennine the 
likelihood that success was a function of being in an expanding rather than a 
declining region and industry. A useful by-product of the death duty period control 
procedure is that individuals are simultaneously separated according to their period 
of business activity, filtering out, to some extent, long run variations in profit 
earning opportunities. The first, second and third cohorts capture individuals active 
in the middle to late nineteenth century, the interwar period and the post-1945 
period respectively. However, in addition to changes over the long run there can be 
industry and region effects that influence the profit and wealth outcomes of 
individuals within the specified cohorts. 
The clear result to emerge from Table 3 is that neither region nor industry 
was a determinate of the rate of lifetime wealth accumulation across the three 
cohorts. At the 95 per cent confidence interval all of the mean rates of return 
overlap for the region and industry variables. The confidence interval serves as a 
prescription for determining the size of the point estimate error and as a method for 
assessing statistical significance of the difference between mean interval estimates. 
It is interesting to note that there is no positive perfonnance effect for 
individuals who were active in London. Contrary to previous assertions, it appears 
that London was not the centre of wealth making in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries around which the wealth of the rest of the country tended to 
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revolve.49 The rate of lifetime wealth accumulation of entrepreneurs in London did 
not deviate significantly from that of entrepreneurs active in the northern half of 
the country. There is no positive performance effect for individuals active in staple 
industries or new technology industries in their epochs of ascendancy. Likewise 
there is no significant negative performance effect for individuals active in staple 
industries during the period of interwar decline. Successful entrepreneurs were 
adept at exploiting wealth making opportunities irrespective of a regional or 
industrial growth rate. These variables do not explain, for our sample of largely 
successful individuals, variations in entrepreneurial performance. 
Recourse to religious affiliation does not improve our ability to explain 
the performance measure results. The rate of return for non-conformists is higher 
than for other religious groups in the first two cohorts, but there is no significant 
difference between the estimated means at the 95 per cent confidence interval. This 
test is somewhat imperfect because the biographical sources provide no systematic 
indication of the degree to which religion affected business decision making. so 
However, if the fostering of information and credit networks proved conducive to 
the growth of firms among non-conformists, as is often claimed in the literature, 
there should be a positive entrepreneurial performance effect. Even if 
nonconformists were over-represented among Britain's class of entrepreneurs, 
compared to their proportions in the population as a whole, our comparative 
performance analysis suggests there was no inclination toward entrepreneurial 
success. 
49 Rubinstein, Men of Property, p. 102; Rubinstein, 'Wealth Occupation and 
Geography' . 
so These problems are noted by Jeremy, Business and Religion, and Capitalists and 
Christians. 
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The most important determinants of entrepreneurial performance 
according to the results in Table 3 were firm type and education. Figures 3-5 
provide a visual representation of the mean rates of return calculated at the 95 per 
cent confidence interval. Two striking patterns emerge from the data. First, there is 
a comparatively low rate of lifetime wealth accumulation for firm inheritors. The 
older the generation, the lower the rate of return; third generation entrepreneurs did 
'fail ' relative to the performance of either firm founders or managers, or both. 
Second, a negative performance effect can be identified for individuals receiving a 
high rather than a lower status education. In the first two cohorts there is a large 
gap in the rate of lifetime wealth accumulation between these two groups. 
Notwithstanding the fact that this gap is bridged in the third cohort an education in 
the upper echelons of the British system - at a Clarendon school or Oxbridge 
College - was associated with negative rates of return. 
Clearly, association does not imply causality and the results must be 
heavily qualified. It is not clear that the type of education per se will influence 
business performance. Recent research has emphasised that differences in the 
nature of science and technology studies in the British as compared with the 
continental education systems do not explain differences in industrialleadership.sl 
Figures 3-5 show that a technical and scientific education was indeterminate of 
business performance for our sample of entrepreneurs. Cross tabulations also 
reveal that 31, 38 and 32 per cent of those in receipt of a high social status 
education in the three cohorts had pursued a technical and scientific course of 
study. A high social status education was associated with low rates of lifetime 
wealth accumulation, but it seems unlikely that a paucity of science and technology 
in its curriculum was the cause. 
SI Berghoff and Mt}lIer, 'Tired Pioneers'; Cassis, Big Business. 
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Family flOO owners by virtue of their wealth could secure for their 
offspring a high social status education in which case firm type or education might 
be instruments for an unobserved family background variable. It is a commonly 
argued in the literature that tradition and elitism in education were important status 
preoccupations for business families that had built up wealth through generations. 
In the first cohort there is evidence of such a connection. A simple bivariate 
probability estimate shows that a flOO inheritor as opposed to a non-inheritor was 
28 per cent more likely to have received a high social status education.52 There are 
complicated links between these aspects of culture and entrepreneurship and it is 
impossible to definitively say that one factor was a more important influence than 
another.5l 
One explanation of the results in Figures 3-5 would be that there are 
diminishing marginal returns to an inheritance, whereby larger inheritances ceteris 
paribus are associated with lower rates of return. Further analysis of the data in 
Table 5 shows that there may be some merit in this argument. Inheriting a family 
firm and possessing a high social status education were positively associated with 
initial and terminal wealth, whereas non-inheritors (flOO founders and managers) 
and those receiving a lower status education, on average, inherited less and 
bequeathed less over a life cycle of business activity. On the other hand, there are 
equally plausible alternative explanations. If entrepreneurial ability is not passed on 
as Marshall contended, there will be a tendency for those who inherit firms to run 
down assets built up over generations. Firm inheritors gain privileged access to the 
52 I estimated a simple probit model and calculated the marginal effect of a unit 
change in the value of the regressor. The slope coefficient is 0.2758 with a standard 
error 0.1049. 
53 Similarly, although there is no significant marginal probability response under 
the same test in the second and third cohorts, it is impossible to pin-point the size 
of the flOO type and education effect. 
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entrepreneurial labour market and may not possess the requisite skills needed for 
success. A comparison of the confidence intervals in Figures 3-5 and in Table 4 is 
particularly revealing. Recall that the rate of return for landowners identifies a 
threshold level below which the rate of return for successful entrepreneurs would 
not be expected to fall. Firm inheritors and individuals receiving a high social 
status education over the three cohorts did not yield significantly higher rates of 
return at the 95 per cent confidence interval than did these landowners. For our 
sample of individuals there is prima facie evidence that these profile characteristics 
were associated with weak entrepreneurship. 
CONCLUSION 
This article advocates a performance measure which links profit income, received 
as the reward for exploiting business opportunities, with the entrepreneur's lifetime 
wealth accumulation. A data set of individuals notable for their business 
achievements in Britain since the middle of the nineteenth century has been 
utilised. The data set is biased towards the inclusion of success stories and in 
favour of those active in manufacturing and mineral extraction industries. 
Nonetheless, these data provide a comprehensive source of information. Successful 
entrepreneurs make the largest contribution to economic growth, while the 
industries covered are those which frame the debate on culture and entrepreneurial 
performance in Britain. 
The cultural critique of British entrepreneurship provides a classic 
example of an historical supposition that has been supported without systematic 
evidence. The purpose of this article has been to establish a corrective formula 
using a different research method and data source. The central fmdings are that 
region of activity, industry of occupation, and religious affiliation were 
indeterminate of entrepreneurial performance, that frrm inheritors performed less 
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well than firm founders and managers, and that a high social status education was 
associated with a negative performance effect. These findings are broadly based 
due to the complex interactions between culture and entrepreneurship. Much 




Aldcroft D., "The Entrepreneur and the British Economy 1870-1914", Economic 
History Review XII (1964). 
Ashton T. S., The Industrial Revolution 1760-1830 (Oxford, 1968). 
Atkinson A. B., The Economics of Inequality (\983) . 
Baumol W. J., Entrepreneurship. Management and the Structure of Payoffs (\988). 
Berghoff H., "British Businessmen as Wealth Holders, 1870-1914 A Closer 
Look", Business Hist01Y vo1.33, no.2 (1991). 
Berghoff H., "Public Schools and the Decline of the British Economy", Past and 
Present no.129 (1990). 
Berghoff H. and Moller R., "Tired Pioneers and Dynamic Newcomers? A 
Comparative Essay on English and German Entrepreneurial History, 1870-1914", 
Economic History Review XXXXVII, 2(1994). 
Blanchflower D. G. and Oswald A. 1., "What Makes an Entrepreneur?", Journal of 
Labour Economics vol.l6, (1998). 
Blanchflower D. G. and Oswald A. J., Entrepreneurship, Happiness and 
Supernormal Returns : Evidence from Britain and the US, Centre for Economic 
Performance Discussion paper no. 134, (1993). 
29 
Broadberry S. N., "How did the United States and Gennany Overtake Britain? A 
Sectoral Analysis of Comparative Productivity Levels 1870-1990", Journal of 
Economic History vol. 58 (1998). 
Cassis Y., Big Business : The European Experience in the Twentieth Century 
(Oxford, 1997). 
Casson, M., The Entrepreneur : An Economic Theory (Aldershot, 1991). 
Chandler, A. D., Scale and Scope The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1990). 
Coleman D. C., "Gentlemen and Players", Economic History Review XXVI (1973) 
Collins B. and Robbins K., eds., British Culture and Economic Decline (London, 
1990). 
Crafts N. F. R., "Forging Ahead and Falling Behind: The Rise and Relative 
Decline of the First Industrial Nation", Journal of Economic Perspectives vol. 12 
(1998). 
Hagen E. E., On the Theory of Social Change (Illinois, 1962). 
Hall R. E. and Mishkin F. S., "The Sensitivity of Consumption to Transitory 
Income : Estimates from Panel Data on Households", Econometrica vol. 50 (1982). 
Hall R. E. "Stochastic Implications of the Life Cycle Pennanent Income 
Hypothesis : Theory and Evidence", Journal of Political Economy vol. 86 (1978). 
30 
Halvorsen R., and Palmquist R., 'Interpretation of Dummy Variables in Semi-
Logarithmic Equations', American Economic Review vol. 70. 
Harbury C. D. and Hitchens D. M. W. N., Inheritance and Wealth Inequality in 
Britain (London, 1979). 
Harbury C. D. and McMahon P. C., "Inheritance and the Characteristics of Top 
Wealth Leavers in Britain", Economic Journal vol. 83, 331 (1973). 
HMSO, The Taxes Acts (1982). 
Horsman E. G., "The Avoidance of Estate Duty by Gifts Inter Vivos Some 
Quantitative Evidence", Economic Journal (1975). 
Howe A. C., Cotton Masters 1830-1860 (Oxford, 1984). 
Jeremy D. 1., Capitalists and Christians .' Business Leaders and the Churches in 
Britain, 1900-1960 (Oxford, 1990). 
Jeremy D. J., ed., Business and Religion in Britain (Aldershot, 1988). 
Jeremy D. 1. and Shaw C., eds ., The Dictionary of Business Biography 5 vols. 
(London 1984-1986). 
Jeremy D. 1. and Tweedale G., Dictionary of Twentieth Century British Business 
Leaders (Manchester, 1994). 
31 
Kindleberger, C. P., Economic Growth in France and Britain, 1851-1950 (Oxford, 
1964). 
Kirby M., 'Quakerism, Entrepreneurship and the Family Firm in North-East 
England', in Brown 1. 8. and Rose M. 8., eds., Entreprenellrship, Networks and 
Modern Business (Manchester, 1993). 
Knight F. H., Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (1923) . 
Kotlikoff L. 1., "Intergenerational Transfers and Savings", Journal of Economic 
Perspectives vol.2 (1988). 
Landes D. S., The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Indllstrial 
Development in Western Europefrom 1750 to the Present (Cambridge, 1969). 
Lawday D. 1., and Mann, E. J., Green's Death Duties (London, 1971). 
Marshall A., Principles of Economics (London, 1890). 
McCloskey D. N ., "Did Victorian Britain Fail?", Economic History Review XXIII, 
3, (1970). 
McCloskey D. N. and Sandberg L., "From Damnation to Redemption: Judgements 
on the Late Victorian Entrepreneur", Explorations in Economic History vol. 9 
(1971). 
Miller 1. G., The Machinery of Succession (1977). 
32 
Mitchell B. R., British Historical Statistics (Cambridge, 1988). 
Modigliani F., "The Role of Intergenerational Transfers and Life Cycle Saving in 
the Accumulation of Wealth", Journal of Economic Perspectives (1988). 
Mueller D. C., Profits in the Long Run (Cambridge, 1986). 
Payne P. L., British Entrepreneurship in the Nineteenth Century (London, 1974). 
Perkin, H. 1., Elites in British Society Since 1880 [computer file]. Colchester, 
Essex: The Data Archive [distributor] (1979). SN: 1157. 
Roper, M., Masculinity and the British Organisation Man Since 1945 (Oxford, 
1994). 
Rose M. 8., 'Beyond Buddenbrooks : The Family Firm and the Management of 
Succession in Nineteenth Century Britain', in Brown 1. 8. and Rose M. 8., eds., 
Entrepreneurship, Networks and Modern Business (Manchester, 1993). 
Rubinstein W. D., Capitalism Culture and Decline in Britain 1750-1990 (London, 
1994). 
Rubinstein W. D., Men of Property : The Very Wealthy in Britain Since the 
industrial Revolution (London, 1981). 
Rubinstein W. D., "The Victorian Middle Classes Wealth Occupation and 
33 
Geography", Economic History Review vol.30 (1977). 
Runkle D. E., "Liquidity Constraints and the Permanent Income Hypothesis 
Evidence From Panel Data", Journal of Monetary Economics vol. 27 (1991). 
Schumpeter J., The Theory of Economic Development (1911). 
Ward D., "The Public Schools and Industry in Britain After 1870", Journal of 
Contemporary HistOlY (1967). 
Warwick, P., "Did Britain Change? An Inquiry into the Causes of National 
Decline", Journal of Contemporary History (1985). 
Whalley, J., "The A voidance of Estate Duty by Gifts Inter Vivos Some 
Quantitative Evidence", Economic Journal vol., 85 (1975). 
Wiener M., English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit 1850-1990 
(Cambridge, 1981). 
Zelder S. P., "Consumption and Liquidity Constraints 



















Kernel Density Estimates of Probate Terminal Wealth 
o I 2 ) 4 S 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 I) 14 IS 16 17 J8 19 
Logarithm orTerminal Wealth (£'m 1938 Prices) 
- - _ - - .283 Individual. 
___ 1079 
Individual. 
Source : see text 
Figure 2 
The Real Rate of Death Duty Charged an a 




..... ¥. ".. .... 
,_. . ./' .,.,' ~" • ~ . _ ~ O.lm 
-' ... .-' . /,' ;,' \.~ •• ""\, _. _ .0.0501 
;' ./ • _. __ O.Olm 
.. I " • 
. ' I I O.OOlm 




.- .. ...".. 
."--.-. '. ~::~ 
18')1 1907 1909 1914 1919 192.5 1930 I~ 19o16 1~9 1954 196) 1969 1980 1984 1986 1918 1990 
Year 
Sources : Lawday and Mann, Death Duties, pp. 1201-1216, HMSO, The Taxes Acts 
35 
Table I - Profile Categories for the Individuals in the Data set 
1149 Individuals 283 Individuals 
% % 
Firm Type Category 
Firm Inheritors 31 59 
Non-Inheritors 69 41 
Third Generation 8 22 
Second Generation 21 36 
Firm Founder 37 20 
Manager 32 21 
Religion Category 
Non-Conformists 21 22 
Education Category 
High Status 72 69 
Lower Status 28 31 
Public School 70 62 
Clarendon School 20 23 
Oxbridge 19 19 
Technical/Scientific 45 34 
industry/Region Category 
Staple 15 29 
New Technology 22 21 
Other Manufacturing 29 29 
London 36 30 
North EastlWest 13 35 
Note : percentages refer to individuals on whom information was available 
Source: see text 
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Table 2 - Wealth Equations 
Cohort I Cohort 2 Cohort 3 
VARIABLE Entrepreneurs Entrepreneurs Entrepreneurs 
(Deaths Before 1919) (Deaths 1919-1945) (Deaths After 1945) 
full Sample Sub-Sample Full Sample Sub-Sample Full Sample Sub-Sample 
Constant -3 .582* -3 .311* -2.274* -2.630* 0.727 1.701 
(0.626) (1.237) (0.625) (0.626) (0.757) (1.245) 
Children 0.035 0.072 0.048 0.043 -0.074 -0.038 
(0.026) (0.055) (0.032) (0.054) (0.070) (0.\32) 
Age 0.015·* 0.013 -0.001 0.008 -0.016" -0.029· 
(0.009) (0.016) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014) 
Philanthropy 0.781* 0.694* 1.293· 0.880* 0.810· 1.003* 
(0.182) (0.335) (0.209) (0.372) (0.209) (0.390) 
F 8.22* 1.96 12.74* 1.97 5.33* 2.97* 
R-sq(adj) 0.065 0.049 0.105 0.033 0.045 0.052 
Observations 273 65 266 86 333 74 
Notes: * significant at 5 per cent level ** significant at 10 per cent level 
A squared age variable was included in the regressions but dropped on an F-test. 
Regressions run for the number of individuals on whom information was available. 
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Table 3 - Rate of Return Estimates 
CATEGORY Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Cohort 3 
Entrepreneurs Entrepreneurs Entrepreneurs 
(Deaths Before 1919) (Deaths 1919-1945) (Deaths After 1945) 
mean s.e. ob n mean s.e. ob n mean ·s.e. ob n 
Pooled (Unwtlghted) 0.0931 0.0165 84 44 0.0406 0.0107 105 46 0,0174 0,0085 94 49 
Firm Type Category 
Firm Inheritors 0.0454 0.0195 47 41 0.0079 0.0072 62 48 -0.0072 0.0070 58 52 
Non-Inheritors 0.15t3 0.0249 37 46 0.0920 0.0231 43 44 0.0570 0.0172 36 45 
Third Generation 0.0282 0.0111 17 41 -0.0058 0.0115 20 42 -0.0057 0.0078 25 48 
Second Generation 0.0557 0.0296 29 41 0.0160 0.0099 39 SI -0.0058 0.011 0 33 SS 
Firm Founder O.l59t 0.0297 29 47 0.1419 0.0420 19 48 
Manager 0.0542 0.0236 24 41 0.0545 0.0203 28 41 
Educallon Category 
High Status 0.0295 0.0205 42 44 0.0178 0,0095 79 46 0.008t 0.0083 77 49 
Lower Status 0.1569 0.0219 42 44 0.1163 0.0296 26 48 0.0596 0.0261 17 SO 
Public School 0.0180 0.0224 36 44 0.0175 0.0102 72 46 0.0103 0.0090 71 48 
Not Public School 0.1491 0.0200 48 43 0.0917 0,0239 33 47 0.0395 0.0205 23 S3 
Clarendon School -0.0009 0.0105 24 44 -0.0204 0.0099 26 45 
Oxbridge -0.0181 0.0\01 22 45 
Technical/Scientific 0.0581 0.0163 25 44 0.0453 0.0167 42 47 0,0462 0,0161 31 46 
No Technical/Scientific 0.1086 0.0224 57 43 0.0374 0,0140 63 46 0.0032 0,0095 63 SO 
Religion Category 
Non-Conformists 0.1262 0.0272 25 41 0.0475 0.0290 19 46 
Other 0.0795 0,0203 59 44 0.0391 0.0115 86 46 
Region/Industry Category 
London 0.0928 0.0240 24 47 0.0280 0.0152 31 46 0,0077 0.0163 29 49 
Not London 0.0933 0.0211 60 42 0.0450 0.0133 66 48 0,0211 0.0120 45 50 
North EastlWest 0,1052 0,0209 39 44 0.0318 0,0134 35 SI 0 ,0221 0 ,0174 24 SO 
Not North EastlWest 0.0828 0.0250 4S 43 0.0451 0.0147 68 44 0.0128 0,0)16 SO 49 
Staple 0.0609 0.0326 27 43 0.0366 0.0226 28 48 
Non-Staple 0.1082 0.0187 57 44 0.0420 0.0122 77 46 
New Technology 0.0446 0.0214 20 45 
Non-New Technology 0.0\01 0.0090 74 50 
Other Manufacturing 0.0969 0.0254 26 42 0.0354 0.0219 27 44 0.0037 0.0099 29 SS 
Notes: (-) reflects missing data, or an insufficient number of observations 
n is number of years of business activity used to estimate the rate of re tu m 
ob is the number of observations 
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Table 4 - Rate of Return Estimates for a Sample of Landowners 
mean s.e. 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Cohort I Landowners 
(Deaths Before 1919) 0.008 0.012 0.0315 -0.0155 
Cohort 2 Landowners 
(Deaths 1919-1945) 0.001 0.014 0.0284 -0.0264 
Cohort 3 Landowners 
(Deaths After 1945) -0.051 0.026 0.0000 -0.1020 
Figure 3 - Rates of Retllrn at the 95 per cent Confidence Interval 
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Table 5 - The Level of Wealth by Finn Type and Education 
CATEGORY Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Cohort 3 Entrepreneurs Entrepreneurs Entrepreneurs 
(Deaths Before 1919) (Deaths 1919-1945) (Deaths After 1945) 
Terminal Initial Terminal Init ial Tenninal Initial 
Wealth £'s Wealth £'s Wealth £'s Wealth £'s Wealth £'s Wealth £'s 
1900 Prices 1900 Prices 1938 Prices 1938 Prices 1980 Prices 1980 Prices 
869,669 287,861 792,507 642,461 2,944,847 5,410,171 
Firm Inheritors mean 
1,729,404 726,512 1,881,981 1,300,390 5,412,767 11 ,487,840 
sI. dev. 297,299 48,065 223,451 292,293 924,961 1,823,480 
median 
Non-Inheritors 253,824 60,088 471,745 121,364 1,947,318 3,741,113 
mean 
283,771 159,924 874,945 382,678 3,881,642 18,999,210 
sI. dev. 137,124 27,254 182,519 15,184 535,659 145,261 
median 
High Status 877,284 350,636 731,336 551,976 2,500,536 5,266,282 
mean 
Education 1,778,339 755,520 1,723,458 1,119,042 4,864,502 16,160,940 
sI. dev. 453,827 82,070 202,956 182,684 827,573 1,259,537 
median 
Lower Status 306,290 18,009 487,483 76,312 2,844,902 2,449,377 
mean 
Education 474 ,696 30,761 973,161 215,070 5,119,655 5,023,373 
sI. dev. 159,639 2,644 221 ,707 7,907 625,474 352,790 
median 
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